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Abstract: This paper studies the effects of seller concentration and static market power on 
tacit collusion in extensively repeated laboratory posted-offer markets.  Contrary to the 
implications of some earlier research, we find that tacit collusion does not become 
pervasive with extensive repetition.  In a ‘strong no power’ design persistently 
competitive outcomes are observed in markets with three or four sellers.  Even duopolies 
are frequently competitive in this design.  Unilateral market power raises prices, as 
predicted.  However, static Nash predictions fail to organize outcomes across power 
treatments, because tacit collusion moves inversely with concentration.  Excess capacity 
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The impressive capacity of static Nash equilibrium (often competitive) 
predictions to organize market outcomes represents one of the most prominent successes 
of using laboratory methods to study market processes (see, e.g., Smith, 1982, or Plott, 
1989).  Markets organized under ‘posted offer’ trading rules, where sellers post prices to 
buyers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, are no exception.  Posted offer markets are of 
prominent interest in industrial organization because they parallel important aspects of 
retail exchange, and because they can be analyzed as games of Bertrand-Edgeworth 
competition.  In such markets, competitive outcomes have been robustly observed even in 
thin markets with as few as three sellers (e.g., Ketcham et al. 1984).  Further, the 
introduction of unilateral market power, in the form of capacity restrictions that assure 
sellers some sales at supra-competitive prices, has a price-increasing effect as static Nash 
equilibria predict (e.g., Davis and Holt, 1994, Davis et al., 2002)  
Nevertheless, the organizing power of static Nash predictions in posted offer 
markets is imperfect.  In some contexts, tacit collusion has been observed with frequency.  
A number of studies conclude that tacit collusion becomes problematic when the number 
of sellers is reduced to two (e.g., Fouraker and Siegel, 1963, Isaac and Reynolds, 2002).  
Of particular note is Dufwenburg and Gneezy (2000) who observe large supra-
competitive deviations in duopolies of very short duration (10 trading periods), even 
when participants are re-matched into new markets each trading period.  Potentially more 
generally problematic are results by Alger (1987) that suggest that extensive repetition 
may make tacit collusion pervasive in even less concentrated markets.  Alger (1987) 
reports results of a series of two, three and four seller posted-offer markets that included 
as many as 140 periods each and finds that prices often increase after initially falling. 
These behavioral results regarding the effects of intense concentration and 
repetition have some intuitive appeal.  Extensive repetition allows sellers increased 
opportunities to develop a ‘language of coordination’ via their pricing activities.  Further, 
to the extent that a two seller structure is not inherently anticompetitive, as results by 
Dufwenberg and Gneezy suggest, fewer sellers presumably make this task even easier.  
Tacit collusion in the form of prices in excess of static Nash predictions have also 
been observed in some ‘market power’ experiments (e.g., Davis and Holt, 1994, Davis et al., 2008a, and Orzen, 2008). However, the same sort of intuitive results regarding the 
effects of increased concentration and repetition observed in no power designs do not 
clearly emerge from the literature examining power designs.  In an experiment of 
relatively short duration, Davis and Holt reduce the number of sellers from five to three 
in a way that leaves static market power unchanged, and find that tacit collusion increases 
only slightly.  In more extensively repeated contexts Orzen (2008) reports a tendency for 
tacit collusion in duopolies but not in thicker (quadropoly) markets, while Davis et al 
(2008a) find more evidence of tacit collusion in thicker (triopoly) markets than in 
duopolies.
1   
In order to improve our understanding of when and how robustly Nash predictions 
may be expected to organize posted offer market outcomes, a good understanding of both 
the causes and pervasiveness of tacit collusion is important.  This paper reports an 
experiment conducted to inform this question.  Specifically, we use a ‘near continuous’ 
variant of the posted-offer trading institution to study the interrelationships between 
concentration, repetition and static market power in generating tacit collusion.
2  By way 
of presummary, we find that, contrary to the implications of Alger (1987), tacit collusion 
is not a pervasive feature of posted-offer markets.  In a ‘strong’ no power design, 
transactions prices in triopolies and quadropolies are uniformly quite competitive, and 
remain so even with very extensive repetition.  Further, in the ‘strong no power’ design 
we find only sporadic evidence that increasing concentration to a duopoly generates 
                                                  
1 Despite several common features Orzen (2008) and Davis et al. (2008a) differ in a number of important 
respects, including opposite predicted comparative static effects of concentration changes.  Orzen examines 
a price setting game where a division of buyers into ‘price sensitive’ and ‘convenience shopping’ segments 
generates a predicted direct relation between the number of sellers and the price cost markup.  Orzen finds 
that theoretical predictions organize behavior well in a ‘static’ condition where sellers are re-matched 
across periods (e.g., prices are higher in quadropolies than in duopolies).  However, when participants 
remained in fixed groups duopoly prices increase, reversing the comparative static predictions observed in 
the re-matched group treatment.  Davis et al. (2008a) studies a more standard design where a reduction in 
the number of sellers increases the central moments of the static NE mixing prediction.  In markets with re-
matching Davis et al. (2008a) observe this predicted comparative static effect.  However in fixed group 
markets, triopoly prices trended up toward those in the duopolies.   
2 In a related paper Davis et al. (2008b) hold the market structure fixed and examine the capacities of 
signaling activity and the underlying propensity of sellers behave cooperatively, to explain tacit collusion.  
Given a structure that is susceptible to tacit collusion (similar to the 3wp treatment examined below), they 
find little evidence that signaling activity (at least the volume of signals sent) affects observed prices, but 
that ‘type’ importantly affects outcomes.  As will be evident below, several of the structural alterations 
studied here appear to dominate the effects of ‘type’ on outcomes. 
  2higher prices as was observed, for example, in the re-mixed markets by Dufwenberg and 
Gneezy (2000).  
We further find that unilateral market power sizably increases prices.  However, 
static Nash predictions do not organize outcomes well across the power treatments 
because tacit collusion arises frequently, and moves inversely with concentration levels.  
In a follow-up experiment we explore the inverse relationship between tacit collusion and 
concentration, and find support for the conjecture that tacit collusion in posted offer 
markets is driven by a ‘follow rate’ which reflects the number (or, if only a subset is 
needed, the percentage) of ‘other’ sellers that must follow a signaler’s price lead in order 
for the signaler to profit from supra-competitive prices in subsequent periods.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 develops the 
experiment design and predictions.  Section 3 presents the experimental procedures.  
Results appear in section 4.  Section 5 considers some additional possible causes of tacit 
collusion in our markets, and reports a follow-up experiment.  The paper concludes with 
a short discussion in Section 6. 
2. Experiment Design  
2.1 The Near-Continuous Posted-Offer Institution.  The posted-offer trading 
institution has a long history in experimental economics (see, e, g., Ketcham et al. 1984).  
Trading occurs in a sequence of ‘periods.’  At the outset of each period, sellers, endowed 
with unit costs, simultaneously make price and maximum offer quantity decisions.  
Production is ‘to demand’ in the sense that sellers incur unit costs only for offered units 
that subsequently sell.  Once all price-posting decisions are complete, a public display of 
prices appears, and a (simulated) buyer makes purchases, starting with the lowest priced 
units.  In the case of a price tie, the buyer divides purchases as evenly as possible among 
the sellers posting the same price.  The buyer routine continues making purchases until 
demand has been exhausted, no further units are available, or until unit values no longer 
exceed the lowest available price.  The period concludes by showing each seller his or her 
own period sales and earnings.   
In most respects, the posted offer implementation used here follows standard 
procedures.  Our markets are distinctive, however, in that they are extensively repeated.  
Each ‘treatment sequence’ in our experiment consists of 220 trading periods.  This large 
  3number of trading periods was made possible by truncating to seven seconds the 
maximum length of decision periods.
3  Procedures are streamlined to facilitate the entry 
of pricing decisions.  Bar graphs that supplement tabular displays of price choices and 
earnings similarly facilitate participants’ interpretation of outcomes.
4  In a previous 
related experiment Davis and Korenok (2008) establish that participants are quite capable 
of interpreting and responding to pricing results in trading periods of such short duration.  
Extensive repetition is particularly useful here in that it allows sellers considerable 
additional opportunities to coordinate their actions.  
2.2 Supply and Demand Arrays.  To examine interactions between concentration 
and unilateral market power in effecting tacit collusion, we use a ‘strong no-power’ 
design, where any seller can service the entire market, and a ‘power’ design, where 
sellers can unilaterally profit by raising their prices above the competitive level.  In each 
case, we vary the number of sellers, n = 2, 3 and 4, creating a total of six treatment cells.   
The strong no-power (‘np’) design shown in Figure 1 is a variant of a stark 
Bertrand environment examined by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000).  As the figure 
illustrates, a buyer will purchase ten units at any price less than or equal to $6 per unit.  
Symmetric sellers are endowed with ten units costing $2 per unit, as the identifiers ‘S1’ 
to ‘S4’ printed below the supply schedule indicate.  Thus, each seller can unilaterally 
service the entire market.  Treatments are separated by the number of sellers.  As the 
supply schedule labeled ‘S2’ indicates, aggregate supply in the two-seller (‘2np’) 
treatment consists of 20 units.  Similarly, aggregate supply increases to 30 and then 40 
units in the 3np and 4np treatments.  Finally, as in Dufwenberg and Gneezy, we impose a 
price floor above unit costs to ensure strictly positive profits.  Here sellers may not post 
prices below $3.  
Using standard arguments, one can readily establish that the competitive price of 
$3 is the unique Nash equilibrium for the market stage game in the strong no power 
treatments.  For example, suppose n=2.  To see that $3 is a Nash equilibrium, observe 
that at a price of $3 each seller sells five units and earns $5.  Any deviation above $3 
                                                  
3 In a number of recent experimental studies, investigators have reduced the maximum length of decision 
periods in order to increase the decision-profile.  Some pertinent oligopoly experiments include Deck and 
Wilson (2002, 2008), Davis and Korenok (2008), and Davis et al. (2008a,b).  
4 For a more complete description of the near continuous posted-offer trading institution, see Davis and 
Korenok (2008). 
  4reduces earnings to zero.  For uniqueness, observe that no pair of different prices above 
$3 can be part of an equilibrium strategy, since earnings for the seller posting the highest 
price will be zero.  Similarly, no common price above $3 can be an equilibrium, since 
either seller could increase earnings by reducing his or her price the minimum possible 
increment below the common price.  
Figure 2 illustrates a complementary power (‘p’) design.  As in the np design, 
demand remains fixed at ten units, which will be purchased at any price of $6 or less.  
Supply conditions distinguish the two designs.  In Figure 2 aggregate supply consists of a 
constant twelve units, offered at a $2 per unit, which is divided evenly among the n=2, 3 
or 4 sellers.  Unlike the strong no-power treatments, no minimum price constrains seller 
pricing decisions.
5  
The restricted supply in Figure 2 creates market power.  For example, in the two-
seller (‘2p’) treatment, sellers S1 and S2 may each offer six units for sale.  Given that the 
buyer will purchase ten units in aggregate, the high pricing seller is assured of selling 
four units at a price of $6 or less.  Notice that $6 cannot be an equilibrium price for this 
game, because at a common price of $6 either seller can unilaterally increase sales to six 
units by reducing his or her price by the minimum possible increment.  Incentives to 
undercut exist on any common price down to a lower bound p2min=$4.67, where selling 
six units as a low pricing seller just equal the security earnings from posting a price of 
$6.
6  The equilibrium for this game involves mixing over a range of prices bounded by $6 
and p2min =$4.67.  In a symmetric equilibrium, each seller prices according to a 
distribution, F2(p) that leaves the other seller indifferent between any price in the support 








.        ( 1 )  
                                                  
5 For purposes of consistency it might have been well to also impose a minimum price at $3.00 in the p 
treatments.  In any case, sellers in the p treatments posted prices below $3.00 relatively infrequently.  Of 
11,880 price postings in the p treatments only 535 (4.5%) were below $3.00.  Further, nearly one third of 
these postings (148) occurred in the first 10 periods of the sequences, before many sellers posted initial 
prices.  For periods 11 to 220 of the sequences (the periods analyzed below in the results section) only 387 
of 11,340 decisions (3.4%) were below $3.00.  
6  That is, solve (p2min- $2)×6 = ($6-$2)×4.  
  5Solving numerically, the mean of F2(p),  25 . 5 $ 2 = p and the mean expected transactions 
price for the market,  17 . 5 $ 2 = pT p .
7
Reasoning similarly, in the 3p treatment sellers mix over the range [$4, $6] and 
price according to the distribution 
2
8 2
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Again using numerical methods, the mean of F3(p),  50 . 4 $ 3 = p  and the mean transactions 
price is  29 . 4 $ 3 = pT p .  For the 4p treatment, the mixing range expands to [$3.33, $6] and 
the symmetric equilibrium pricing distribution becomes  








p F .        ( 3 )  
The mean of F4(p),  73 . 3 $ 4 = p  and the mean transactions price is  49 . 3 $ 4 = pT p .
8  
The primary distinguishing features of the p design for this investigation are that 
(a) static equilibrium prices in p treatments exceed those in corresponding np treatments, 
and (b) that across p treatments prices rise as the number of sellers fall.   
2.4 Conjectures. Table 1 summarizes the experiment design.  Moving down 
entries for the strong no power design, shown in column (1), observe that  npT p =300¢ in 
each case.  As the experiments discussed above in the literature review suggest, we might 
anticipate more tacit collusion as concentration increases in this design, particularly when 
the number of sellers is reduced to two.  Further, to the extent that results by Alger (1987) 
are pertinent, extensive repetition should generate increased levels of tacit collusion.  
This is a first conjecture. 
Conjecture 1: In a strong no power design, tacit collusion increases with concentration.  
Further, tacit collusion becomes more pronounced with extensive repetition. 
                                                  
7 We focus on mean transactions prices in the results section because they allow a more complete 
assessment of tacit collusion than mean posted prices (see note 13 below).  Notice that  2 2 p p T <  because 
the expected price realizations are weighted by sales quantities, and the low pricing seller always enjoys a 
higher sales volume.  An online appendix provides details of the mean transactions price calculations for 
the power treatments. 
8 Due to the constraints imposed by constant earnings and identical distributions, uniqueness in symmetric 
strategies follows obviously for each game n=2, 3 and 4.  No demonstration of overall uniqueness for these 
mixed strategy equilibria exists.  Cripps and Ireland (1988), however, does establish the uniqueness of the 
mixed strategy equilibrium for a two seller game in this ‘box’ design.   
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Comparing across the strong no power and power designs, observe that the 
introduction of unilateral market power substantially increases (mean) static predicted 
prices.  This second conjecture is to confirm results in related environments (e.g., Davis 
and Holt, 1994).  
Conjecture 2: Holding the number of sellers fixed, shifting from the ‘strong no power’ 
treatment to a ‘power’ treatment raises prices.  
 
Finally, within the power treatment notice that static Nash predictions move 
inversely with the number of sellers.  Observe further, that to the extent tacit collusion is 
more easily organized in markets with fewer rather than more sellers, and to the extent 
repetition facilitates communication, these comparative static predictions should become 
more pronounced with repetition.  This is our third conjecture. 
Conjecture 3: In the power treatments tacit collusion increases with concentration.  
Extensive repetition enhances this effect. 
 
3.  Experiment Procedures  
The primary experiment consists of six markets in each of the six design/number 
of seller treatment combinations, for a total of 36 markets.  Data were collected in a series 
of six laboratory sessions.  Each session consisted of two sequences.  At the beginning of 
the first sequence, nine participants were divided into three markets, one with two sellers, 
a second with three sellers and a third with four sellers.  Participants made a series of 220 
repeated decisions in either an np treatment, or in a p treatment after which the market 
was terminated without prior announcement.  Following the conclusion of the first 
sequence, participants were reshuffled into a new set of three markets, and a second 
sequence began, this sequence using treatments in the design (p or np) not used in the 
first sequence.  The second sequence also consisted of 220 periods and was again 
terminated without prior announcement. 
To control for potential order-of-sequence effects, sessions were blocked by 
designs, with the p design treatments appearing first in three sessions and np design 
treatments appearing first in the remaining three sessions.  Also, to minimize possible 
‘carryover’ effects, participants were re-matched in a way that minimized re-contacts 
  7across sequences.
9  This procedure generated a total of six p and np markets in each 
number/design combination. 
Finally, in all sessions sellers were given no information regarding underlying 
supply and demand conditions.  Thus, sellers operated in light of only their private costs 
and the public messages of the market.
10  Also, to avoid focal price effects, the $3 price 
minimum was not announced in the instructions of the np sessions.  Rather, participants 
encountered the price bound in the course of exchange.
11
Subjects were 64 student volunteers enrolled in business and economics courses 
at Virginia Commonwealth University in the spring semester of 2005.  All subjects were 
‘institution experienced’ in the sense that they had participated a previous session in the 
near-continuous posted-offer trading institution, but in a different design.  No one 
participated in more than one of the sessions reported here.  Laboratory dollars were 
converted to U.S. dollars at a rate of each $1 U.S. currency for each $200 in the 
laboratory.  Earnings for the roughly 100 minute sessions, ranged from $17.5 to $32.50 
and averaged about $24.00 (inclusive of a $6 appearance fee).
12
                                                  
9 Specifically, one triopolist and one quadropolist from the first sequence formed the second sequence 
duopoly.  Similarly, a duopolist a triopolist and a quadropolist from the first sequence were combined to 
form the second sequence triopoly.  The remaining first sequence participants (e.g., one duopolist, one 
triopolist and two quadropolists) formed the second-sequence quadropoly.   
10  Whether or not information regarding underlying aggregate supply and demand conditions should be 
provided to participants in market experiments is a controversial issue (see e.g., Smith 2003).  However, 
results reported in Davis et al. (2008a) suggest that in environments like those studied here, with symmetric 
sellers and a simulated buyer, this choice does not importantly affect outcomes. 
11 In a pilot session, announcing a $3 price minimum in the instructions led many sellers to open with a $3 
price, suggesting that the prior announcement of the minimum made it unnecessarily focal. 
12 In some instances more participants appeared for a session than could be used.  These ‘alternates” were 
paid a $10 appearance fee, and were invited to participate in a future session. 
  84. Results  
4.1 Overview.  We present data in terms of mean transactions prices.
13   The mean 
transaction prices paths for the strong no power and power treatments shown in Figure 3 
provide an overview of experimental results.  The no power treatments, shown in the left 
column of the Figure, illustrate a strong tendency for prices to collapse on the $3.00 
competitive prediction in the 3np and 4np treatments after 10 to 15 trading periods.  
Further, repetition does nothing to undermine the general competitiveness of markets in 
these treatments.  Compared to the three and four seller treatments, transaction prices in 
the 2np treatment are less uniformly competitive.  Nevertheless, throughout the sequence 
mean transaction prices in the 2np treatment are much closer to the competitive 
prediction than to the joint maximizing prediction.  
Comparing mean transactions prices for the power treatments, shown in the right 
column of Figure 3, with the no power treatments in the left column reveals the large and 
persistent price-increasing effect of introducing unilateral market power.  The right 
panels of Figure 3 make apparent two other features of results in the power treatments.  
Observe first that mean transactions prices in the power treatments do not follow the 
comparative static predictions associated with reducing the number of sellers.  To the 
contrary, deviations from the static Nash prediction (shown in each panel as a dashed 
line) increase as the number of sellers increase.  Notice second that although outcomes in 
the power treatments are generally more variable than in the no-power treatments, the 
bulk of price adjustments again occur in the first 10 to 15 trading periods.  
  One feature of results not evident from Figure 3 regards the variability of market 
outcomes within treatments.  The mean transactions prices for the first and last half of 
each market (excluding initial adjustment periods 1-10) shown in Table 2 provide some 
                                                  
13  In a number of experimental investigations of tacit collusion (e.g, Davis et al., 2008b, Isaac et al., 1984, 
and Potters and Suetens, 2008), results are presented in terms of a ‘collusive efficiency index’ (or a related 
name), which summarizes the percentage of possible supra-competitive earnings extracted by sellers each 
period.  Our interest in assessing both price (in conjecture 2) and tacit collusion (in conjectures 1 and 3) 
makes convenient the use of mean transactions prices here.  In our no power treatments, the collusive 
efficiency index is essentially a linear transformation of the mean transactions price (e.g., the collusive 
efficiency of market j in period t, ψjt = (πjt - πNE)/ (πJPM - πNE) =  ) 3 6 /( ) 3 ( − − Tjt p , where πjt denotes 
realized profits, πNE denotes static Nash profits and πJPM denotes joint maximizing profits, and where 
Tjt p  
denotes the mean transactions price, 6 is the joint maximizing price and 3 is the competitive price).  In the 
power treatments, this simple transformation breaks down, because the Nash prediction changes across 
treatments.  Nevertheless, evaluation of outcomes in terms of ψjt does not affect our conclusions. 
  9pertinent insight.  Inspecting the mean transactions prices for strong no power treatments, 
shown in the upper panel, the striking homogeneity of the 3np and 4np treatments is most 
noticeable, particularly when viewed in light of the high variability of outcomes in the 
power treatments, shown in the lower panel.  Note also in the no power treatments, 
however, that in the 2np markets transactions prices were also very nearly competitive 
(e.g., within 15¢ of 300) in the majority of instances.  Comparatively high mean prices 
for the 2np treatment are driven by substantially elevated prices in a pair of 2np markets 
for the first 105 periods, and by a different pair for the final 105 periods.  In the 
remainder of this section we establish these observations more formally as findings by 
evaluating conjectures 1 to 3, using as data the mean transactions prices in Table 2.  
4.2 Tacit Collusion in the Strong No Power Design.  Table 3 presents data 
pertinent to the evaluation of tacit collusion in the strong no power design, the subject of 
conjecture 1.  As indicated by the comparisons shown in columns (1) to (3) in the upper 
panel of the table, mean transaction price differences across treatments, while not terribly 
large (36¢ or less), are significantly higher in duopolies than in the first half of the 
triopolies or in both the first and second halves of the quadropolies.
14   
Nevertheless, the relatively higher prices in the 2np treatment provide only 
limited evidence that duopoly markets are importantly impacted by tacit collusion.  Many 
‘competitive’ experimental markets are often characterized by some non-trivial price 
variability, and there is no agreement among experimentalists as to the level of mean 
deviation from competitive predictions sufficient to classify a market outcome as ‘tacitly 
collusive’.  Suppose, however, that as in Davis et al. (2008b), we identify those markets 
in which sellers realize at least 10% of the maximum available supra-competitive profits 
(here within 30¢ of the competitive prediction) as collusively impacted.  As seen in the 
middle panel of Table 3, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that mean prices in 
any of the strong no power treatments are in this sense collusively impacted.  
Observe finally from the bottom of Table 3, that increased repetition does nothing 
to foster tacit collusion.  To the contrary, as the negative entries at the bottom of the table 
                                                  
14 In what follows we use the permutation, or Fisher’s exact probability test for making comparisons across 
treatments, and the Wilcoxon test for comparing observed and predicted outcomes within treatments.  We 
follow the convention of terming p<.01 as ‘highly significant’, p<.05 as ‘significant’ and p<.10 as ‘weakly 
significant’ 
  10indicate, mean transaction prices fall slightly in each of the three treatments.  These 
results form a first finding. 
Finding 1: In the strong no power design, tripolies and quadropolies are persistently 
competitive even with extensive repetition.  Although duopoly prices exceed those in the 
trioplies and quadropolies, the duopoly treatment is not importantly impacted by tacit 
collusion, even after extensive repetition.  
 
Finding 1 is interesting in light of previous results by Alger (1987) and 
Duwfenberg and Gneezy (2000).  As Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) report, we find 
duopoly prices in the no power treatment significantly exceed those in the three and four 
seller counterparts.  Nevertheless, our ‘no power’ duopolies are not consistently 
collusive, and mean transaction price deviations, are much smaller than Dufwenberg and 
Gneezy (2000) report.  (In our duopolies mean transaction price deviations are about 11% 
of the range between the competitive and joint maximizing outcome.  In their comparable 
markets Dufwenberg and Gneezy observe a deviation of about 27% of the same range.)  
Further, in contrast to the implications of Alger (1987), extensive repetition does not 
make posted offer markets inherently anticompetitive.  To the contrary mean prices fall 
slightly (albeit insignificantly) in the second half of each strong no power treatment.  
 
4.3 Market Power versus the Strong No Power Design.  Table 4 compares mean 
transaction prices across the power and strong no power treatments.  As seen in the upper 
panel of the table, the introduction of market power both significantly and sizably 
increases transactions prices relative to the strong no power treatment.  Notice in the 
bottom panel of Table 4 that while in all power treatments mean prices increase slightly 
in the second half of sequences relative to the first, the differences are never significant.  
These results form a second finding, which largely calibrates our results with other 
pertinent studies (e.g., Davis and Holt, 1994).  
Finding 2: Unilateral Market Power raises prices relative to the strong no power design. 
Repetition does not significantly increase prices in the power treatments. 
 
4.4 Tacit Collusion in the Power Design.  A predicted consequence of introducing market 
power is that mean prices move inversely with the number of sellers.  However, as seen 
in the bottom two rows of Table 2, while mean prices in more concentrated markets tend 
to exceed those in their less concentrated counterparts, the differences are much smaller 
  11than predicted.  Table 5 summarizes results of some statistical comparisons pertinent to 
these differences.  As shown in the top panel of Table 5, while mean transaction prices 
tend to increase slightly with concentration in the power treatments, the differences are 
small, and significant in only one of the six comparisons (the comparison between  pT p2  
and  pT p4  in the first sequence half, where a difference of 168 cents is predicted).  The 
bottom panel of Table 5 highlights the reason for the smaller than predicted price 
differences across the power treatments:  for the 2p treatment, deviations from static Nash 
predictions are less than 30¢ (10% of the joint maximizing to minimum price range), but 
are both much larger on average and significant in the 3p and 4p treatments.  These 
findings combine to form a third result. 
Finding 3: Increased concentration does not significantly raise prices in the power 
design, because tacit collusion tends to be higher in three and four seller power 
treatments than in duopolies. 
 
5. “Follow Rates” and Tacit Collusion.  
Results of these extensively repeated markets parallel the existing literature in the 
sense that, relative to the strong no power treatment, a reduction of capacity sufficient to 
create market power tends to raise prices.  However results are less consistent with the 
informal, albeit largely intuitive ideas that both concentration and repetition facilitate 
tacit collusion.  In the strong no power treatment, we do observe some instances of larger 
price deviations in the 2np treatment than in the 3np or 4np treatment.  However, these 
effects are not a consequence of increased repetition.  Further, most 2np markets are quite 
competitive.  More problematically, we observe clearer evidence tacit collusion in the 
power designs, but it decreases with concentration.  
The purpose of this section is to explore this latter, rather curious result.  Notice 
first that coordinated activity does not explain instances of tacit collusion.  Identifying 
coordinated pricing or quantity posting activity, along with mechanisms for punishing 
‘defectors’ who fail to comply with a tacit arrangement lies at the heart of antitrust policy 
towards tacit collusion.
15  Table 6 provides some evidence regarding coordinated 
behavior in our markets.  Columns (2) and (3) list the percentage of periods where sellers 
                                                  
15 See, for example, section 2.1 of the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1997). 
  12posted identical supra-competitive prices in the power and no power treatments.  Sellers 
never posted the same price in more than 5.9% of the time in any 105-period segment. 
Similarly, as seen in columns (4) and (5) sellers repeated a rotation of quantities across 
sellers (as would be consistent with a collusive quantity rotation scheme) no more than 
3% of the time.  Notably, both of these ‘high’ numbers occurred in duopoly treatments 
where sellers are quite likely to occasionally stumble on apparently coordinated price or 
quantity outcomes by chance.  Further, those treatments with the most tacit collusion 
exhibited the least evidence of such coordinated behavior.  For example, sellers in the 4p 
markets posted the same prices in no more than 1.3% of periods, and never repeated a 
rotation of sales quantities across sellers.  For this reason, we are skeptical that the 
development of a ‘language of coordination’ explains the tacit collusion observed in these 
markets.  
Unstructured signaling and response activity represents a possible alternative 
explanation for observed tacit collusion.  Both the costs of signaling and the likelihood 
that rivals respond to a signal may affect the success of such activity.  Relative to the 
strong no power treatment, the costs of sending signals are lower in the power treatment, 
since sellers with power are, by definition, certain to sell at least some units each period 
as long as they price at or below the $6 upper limit price.  However, while reduced 
signaling costs might explain higher prices in the power treatments relative to the strong 
no power treatments, signaling cost differences cannot explain price patterns observed 
within the power treatments, because the amount of unilateral power (and thus the extent 
to which signaling costs are low) moves directly with concentration.  In the 2p design a 
seller making a price posting ‘signal’ of $6 foregoes the profits associated with the sale of 
1/3 of capacity (two out of six available units).  In the 3p and 4p treatments a similar $6 
signal implies that sellers forego earnings from the sale of 1/2 and 2/3 of their respective 
capacities.  For this reason, in the power treatments, signaling cost changes should 
exacerbate rather than condense predicted differences in static Nash outcomes.  
Differences in the likelihood that ‘other’ sellers will respond to a signal in a way 
that allows a signaler to profit from supra-competitive price postings in future periods 
represents a feature of the power treatments that is consistent with observed outcomes.  In 
the 2p treatment, the sole non-signaling ‘other’ seller must respond in order for a signal to 
  13be potentially profitable.  In the 3p treatment this ‘follow rate’ falls to 1/2 as only one of 
the two non-signaling rivals must follow a signal for it to be effective.  Reasoning 
similarly, the follow rate falls to 1/3 in the 4p treatment.  
In contrast, in the strong no power design, all remaining rivals must raise 
transactions prices in the 2np, 3np and 4np treatments, making the follow rates in each 
case 1, 2 and 3 respectively, reflecting the increased difficulty of getting both or all three 
other sellers to simultaneously respond to a signal with a price increase.  
5.1. A Weak No Power Design. To test the notion that this ‘follow rate’ may 
explain tacit collusion we conducted an additional 12 markets in a pair of treatments that 
are a hybrid of the power and strong no power designs.  The idea is simple: we increase 
excess capacity relative to the power treatment sufficiently to remove static market power 
(thus making signaling costs equal to those in the np treatments), but not so much as to 
affect the follow rates in the power treatments.  
Figure 4 illustrates supply and demand arrays for three and four seller 
implementations of this ‘weak no power’ design.  Sellers are endowed with nine units 
each period which can be offered at a constant $2 per unit.  For comparability with the 
strong no power designs, sellers may not post a price below $3.  When n=2, the 
automated buyer will purchase the entire capacity of one seller (making the 2np and 2wp 
designs equivalent).  When n=3 or 4 the buyer will purchase is 9n-2 units at prices of $6 
or less, making the follow rate fall from 1 to 1/2 and then 1/3, respectively.
16
Using arguments identical to those used in the np design, one can readily verify 
that $3 is a unique Nash equilibrium for each of the wp treatments analyzed as a stage 
game.  The novelty of this design is that to the extent the follow rate explains tacit 
collusion, we should observe (a) higher prices in the 3wp and 4wp markets than in their 
3np and 4np counterparts (despite the fact that the competitive price is the unique static 
Nash equilibrium in each treatment) and (b) levels of tacit collusion in weak no power 
                                                  
16 In constructing this design, seller endowments and demand equal nine units rather than the ten units 
shown in Figures 1 and 2.  This change was inadvertent and in no way affects the analysis.  Also, following 
Smith and Williams (1990) and Cason and Williams (1990) demand is set so that the seller posting the 
second highest price sells seven rather than all nine of his or her units.  As Cason and Williams (1990) 
observe, this minor demand alteration allows a rank ordering of price choices in terms of sales quantities, a 
feature that is not terribly important here.  
  14treatment similar to those observed in comparable power treatments.  This is a fourth 
conjecture. 
Conjecture 4:  The ‘follow rate’ predicts tacit collusion.  In particular (a) tacit collusion 
in the ‘weak no power’ design will exceed that observed in the ‘strong no power design’, 
and (b) tacit collusion levels in the weak no power treatments will not differ from those 
observed in comparable power treatments. 
 
The 3wp and 4wp markets were conducted in the fall semester of 2005 as a series of six 
additional sessions, using a total of 42 participants.  In all critical respects, procedures for 
this second set of sessions paralleled those described for the initial sessions.  However, 
unlike the earlier sequences, wp sequences were not mixed either within or across 
sessions.  That is, the six 3wp markets were conducted as a series of three nine-
participant sessions that included only 3wp markets.  Similarly, the six 4wp markets were 
conducted as a series of three twelve-participant sessions that included only 4wp markets.  
Each wp sequence was the second portion of a two-sequence session.
17  Earnings in this 
second set of sessions ranged from $15 to $41.25 and averaged $26.50. 
5.2 Results- Weak No Power Sessions.  As evidenced by the mean transactions price 
paths for the 3wp and 4wp treatments shown in Figure 5, mean transactions prices very 
substantially exceed static Nash predictions in the wp design, this despite the fact that the 
static Nash equilibrium is $3.00, as in the strong no power treatments.  Mean transactions 
prices for the first and second (post initial) 105-period segments of individual 3wp and 
4wp markets shown in Table 7 give some sense of the variability of outcomes within 
markets (we repeat results of the 2np markets here for purposes of comparison).  Note in 
Table 7 the outcome variability parallels that observed in the power treatments.   
  Tables 8 and 9 allow a more formal evaluation of conjecture 4.  Table 8 evaluates 
the null hypothesis that prices (and thus tacit collusion) is no higher in the three and four 
seller weak no power treatments than in their strong no power counterparts.  As is clear 
from the entries, differences are uniformly large and significant.  To assess the extent to 
which the weak no power design captures tacit collusion observed in the power 
                                                  
17 The design in the first sequence of the wp sessions was a ‘trend supply’ design, parallel to the trend 
demand design studied in the near-continuous context by Davis and Korenok (2008) except that the supply 
curve rather than the demand curve was subjected to a series of first inflationary and then deflationary 
shocks.  We have no reason to believe that this initial sequence affected participants in any way other than 
to allow them to become experienced with the near-continuous framework.  
  15treatments, Table 9 compares deviations from static Nash predictions across the power 
and weak no power treatments.  Notice in Table 9 that the differences in mean deviations 
across treatments tend to be positive, indicating more tacit collusion in the weak no 
power treatments than in the power treatments.  Although none of these differences are 
evenly weakly significant, these data do suggest that we observe at least as much tacit 
collusion in the weak no power treatments as in the power treatment.
18  Results in Tables 
8 and 9 combine to form a final finding. 
Finding 4:  The ‘follow rate’ is consistent with important dimensions of observed tacit 
collusion.  Prices in ‘weak no power’ treatments significantly exceed prices in their 
counterpart ‘strong no power’ treatments.  Further, deviations from static Nash 
predictions in weak no power treatments do not significantly differ from those observed 
in comparable power treatments.  
 
6. Discussion  
This paper reports an experiment conducted in an extensively repeated ‘near-
continuous’ framework to examine factors that affect tacit collusion in laboratory posted-
offer markets.  We find that neither concentration nor extensive repetition exert the 
expected effects of importantly increasing tacit collusion.  Results of markets in a strong 
no power design show that tacit collusion is not an inherent feature of posted offer 
markets when very extensively repeated.  Further, although we observed instances of tacit 
collusion in the strong no power duopolies, this treatment is not importantly impacted by 
tacit collusion.  Results of ‘power’ design markets indicate that unilateral market power 
raises prices relative to the strong no power design, as predicted.  However, the central 
moments of the static mixing distribution do not organize observed prices within the 
power design treatments because tacit collusion tends to increase as the number of sellers 
is expanded beyond two.  Observing that no obvious ‘language of coordination’ evolves 
in any of our markets, we suggest that relatively unstructured signaling and response 
activity may explain the tacit collusion in our markets, and conjecture that a ‘follow rate’ 
which reflects the number (or, if only a subset is needed the percentage) of ‘other’ sellers 
in a market that must follow a signal in order for the signaler to profit from his action in a 
                                                  
18 Notice that unlike results reported in the other tables, two-tailed tests are appropriate here, because the 
null hypothesis is that deviations prices in the power and no power treatments are the same.  
  16future period explains tacit collusion.  In a follow up experiment we find some support 
for this conjecture.
19   
These results are important, both from the perspective of behavioral market 
research and for policy purposes.  For laboratory market research, our results offer two 
insights.  First is the procedural insight that extensive repetition may, in many instances, 
not importantly affect tacit collusion.  Although sellers clearly need a limited number of 
initial adjustment periods, behavior did not importantly change thereafter.  Thus, our 
results suggest that outcomes in standard 35-40 period laboratory markets may in many 
instances elicit results that do not differ substantially from what would be observed in 
markets of substantially longer duration.  Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, 
results here indicate that while tacit collusion is not a pervasive phenomenon in posted 
offer markets, the combined design properties of (a) a competitive equilibrium that is a 
unique Nash equilibrium for the market stage game, and (b) a structure with more than 
two sellers, are generally not sufficient to generate a behaviorally competitive outcome.  
The potential policy implications of our results follow from this latter observation.  
Our point is not that a duopoly structure is necessarily competitive.  To the contrary, the 
only instances of significant tacit collusion we observed in our strong no power design 
occurred in the 2np treatment.  Rather, our point is that less concentrated structures exist 
that are even more susceptible to tacit collusion than duopolies.   
To some degree, the definition of antitrust markets in the US Department of 
Justice/ Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines may anticipate the 
competitive problems we observe here.  Under the Guidelines, an antitrust market for a 
non price-discriminating industry is defined as the smallest set of sellers, who, acting in a 
hypothetical conspiracy could effect “at least a small but significant and nontransitory 
price increase” (Sec. 1.11).  Here, for example, in the weak no power markets, just two 
sellers must raise prices to the $6 upper limit to increase profits, suggesting that both the 
3wp and 4wp structures may be regarded as duopolies for antitrust purposes.  Similarly, 
                                                  
19 The follow rate is largely determined by excess capacity. In an earlier version of this paper, we also 
observe that in our design excess capacity and the ‘Friedman coefficient’ or the minimum discount rate 
necessary to support tacit collusion as a grim ‘trigger strategy’ equilibrium (Friedman, 1971) are very 
highly correlated.  We are, however, skeptical that it is changes in discount rate that drive observed tacit 
collusion.  As we noted in Table 6, there is very little to suggest that sellers engaged in the sort of 
coordinated activity consistent with such an equilibrium, even in markets characterized by very substantial 
levels of tacit collusion.  
  17via this reasoning each of the power treatments may be regarded as monopolies for 
antitrust purposes.  
However, the Guidelines’ market definition test is perhaps importantly deficient 
in that it appears to focus on the profitability of small price increases.
20  In the weak no 
power treatments only very large price increases above a competitive level are profitable.  
Thus, our 3wp and 4wp markets would likely not be identified as duopolies, and our 
power markets would not be identified as monopolies.
21  That tacit collusion appears to 
be more of a problem in our three and four seller power and weak no power treatments 
than in comparable duopolies enhances the potential importance of this deficiency. 
One possible approach for practically addressing this potential shortcoming in 
antitrust market definition would involve increased attention to excess capacity.  Both 
signaling costs (measured as static market power) and follow rates are directly related to 
excess capacity.  Starting from a context that elicits competitive outcomes, initial excess 
capacity reductions reduce the follow rate, increasing the likelihood of tacit collusion.  
Still further excess capacity reductions reduce signaling costs as they create unilateral 
market power.  Results of our laboratory markets suggest that small amounts of excess 
capacity or perhaps efforts by sellers to acquire and remove excess capacity may be 
important indicators of likely tacit collusion, even in relatively unconcentrated markets, 
and even in the absence of any obvious mechanisms for coordination or enforcement.
 22  
In any case, our results suggest that further attention to the effects of excess capacity on 
tacit collusion is warranted. 
 
                                                  
20 Although the Guidelines do not exclude the possibility of larger price increases, the focus is clearly on 
small increases.  For example, the Guidelines take care to objectively identify a ‘small but significant and 
not transitory price increase’ as a 5% increase for the foreseeable future, but offer not discussion of when 
the consideration of larger price increases might be appropriate. 
21 The unilateral effects described in section 2.2 of the Guidelines would potentially identify as problematic 
a change in the static Nash equilibrium induced by the introduction of market power.  However, the current 
Guidelines would not anticipate the tacit collusion in the form of price above the Nash equilibrium we 
observe in our 3p and 4p markets 
22  For example, the FTC’s complaint against Arch Coal et al. (2004) would seem to fit this prescription.  
The merger involved a consolidation from 4 sellers to 3 in the production of a grade of high BTU Coal in 
the Western U.S. (or 5 sellers to 5, but with an HHI increase, in the production of combined ‘higher grade’ 
BTU coals.)  Sellers were capacity constrained, and Arch Coal appeared to be purchasing excess capacity 
and removing it from production.  District Judge John D. Bates dismissed the FTC’s case, because the 
Commission failed to provide satisfactory evidence of coordinated post-merger activity. See FTC vs. Arch 
Coal et al. 04-0534, August 16, 2004.   
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Figure 5. Mean Transactions prices for the 3wp and 4wp treatments. 
 
 
  23 
Table 1. Mean Static Price Predictions, Strong No Power 
and Power Designs (¢) 
(1)  
Strong No Power Design 
(2)  
Power Design 
Treatment  npT p   Treatment  pT p  
4np  300  4p  349 
3np  300  3p  429 
2np  300  2p  517 
 
 
Table 2.  Mean Transaction Prices by Treatment (¢) 
 
Strong No Power Treatments 
  Periods 11-115    Periods 116-220 
Market  2np  3np  4np   2np 3np 4np 
i  383  301  301  300  300  300 
ii  327  302  300  400  300  300 
iii  312  301  300  383  300  300 
iv  301  301  303  300  302  300 
v  306  300  300  301  300  300 
vi  388  300  305  306  300  300 
          
T p   336  301  302  332  300  300 
T NE p   300  300  300  300  300  300 
 
Power Treatments 
Market  2p  3p  4p  2p  3p  4p 
i  508  563  490  547  556  474 
ii  538  546  413  533  576  484 
iii  564  377  553  557  479  576 
iv  498  496  486  562  464  357 
v  452  463  326  444  462  461 
vi  545  484  493  571  569  557 
          
T p   518  488  460  536  518  485 
T NE p   517  429  349  517  429  349 
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Table 3. Mean Differences, Strong No Power Design (¢) 
 





0 3 2 ≤ − npT npT p p  
(2) 
0 4 2 ≤ − npT npT p p  
(3) 






nd   32
** 31  0 
 
Concentration – Absolute Effects 
Ho
: 30 . 0 2 ≤ − NE npT p p   30 . 0 2 ≤ − NE npT p p   30 . 0 4 ≤ − NE npT p p  
1
st 36 1  2 
2
nd   32  0  0 
 
Repetition Effects 
Ho:  0 1 2 2 2 ≤ − T np T np p p  
Notes: 1
st: periods 11-115, 2
nd: periods 116-220. ** p<.05 permutation test (one tailed) 
 
0 1 3 2 3 ≤ − T np T np p p   0 1 4 2 4 ≤ − T np T np p p  
2
nd vs. 1
st   -5  -1  -2 
 
 
Table 4. Mean Differences Across Power and Strong No Power Designs (¢) 
 
Mean Price Differences  
Ho
: (1) 
0 2 2 ≤ − npT pT p p  
(2) 
0 3 3 ≤ − npT T p p  
(3) 












Repetition and Mean Prices in Power Treatments 
Ho:  0 1 2 2 2 ≤ − T p T p p p   0 1 3 2 3 ≤ − T p T p p p   0 1 4 2 4 ≤ − T p T p p p  
2
nd vs. 1
st   18  29  25 
Notes: 1
st: periods 1-115, 2
nd: periods 116-220. *** p<.01 permutation test (one tailed) 
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Table 5. Mean Differences, Power Design (¢) 
 





0 3 2 ≤ − pT pT p p  
(2) 
0 4 2 ≤ − pT pT p p  
(3) 





nd   1  51  33 
 
Concentration – Absolute Differences 
 
Ho










st: periods 11-115, 2
nd: periods 116-220. * p<.10, ** p<.05 permutation tests (one tailed) 
† p<.10, 




Table 6.  Some Indicators of Cooperative Behavior (%) 







(5)  (6) 
11-115  116-220  
Strong No Power (np) Design 
4np  0 0 0  0 
3np  0 0 0  0 
2np  5.2 5.6  3  1 
 
Power (p) Design 
4p  1.3 0  0  0 
3p  2.1 1.4  0  0 
2p  5.9 4.0 2.7  1.2 
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Table 7.  Mean Transaction Prices: Weak No Power Treatment (¢) 
 
Strong No Power Treatments 
  Periods 11-115    Periods 116-220 
Market  2wp(=2np)  3wp  4wp   2wp=(2np) 3wp 4wp 
i  383 366  458    300  453  509 
ii  327 500  394    400  565  392 
iii  312 451  499    383  393  425 
iv  301 308  393    300  365  315 
v  306 399  418    301  489  419 
vi  388 367  348    306  397  476 
             
T p   336 399  418    332  444  423 
T NE p   300 300  300    300  300  300 
 
 
Table 8. Mean Transaction Price Comparisons: Weak No Power 
vs. Strong No Power Designs (¢) 
Mean Price Differences 
Ho:  (1)  (2) 










st: periods 11-115, 2




Table 9. Differences in Mean Deviations Static Nash Predictions: Power 
vs. Weak No Power Designs (¢) 
Ho:  (1) 
0 2 2 = − pTdev wpTdev p p  
(2) 
0 3 3 = − pTdev wpTdev p p  
(3) 
0 4 4 = − pTdev wpTdev p p  
1
st 36 39  7 
2
nd   13  55  -13 
Notes: Each test compares the deviation of mean transaction prices from the static Nash equilibrium 
prediction for the treatment.  1
st: periods 11-115, 2
nd: periods 116-220. * p<.10 permutation test (two tailed) 
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